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THE JUDICIALIZATION OF FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKING
GERALD M. PoPs*

Students of the American federal administrative legal process
have long debated the question of whether those persons charged
with the responsibility for developing and conducting the formal
hearing process and for making "initial decisions"' in agency adjudication 2 should act more like judges or more like administrators.
Advocates of the judicial model of behavior seek to inject into the
administrative process certain values inherent and traditional in
Anglo-American courts. These values particularly, although not
exclusively, include the protection of the personal, property and
procedural rights of private citizens which have been developed by
judges acting in their traditional capacities as makers of common
law and interpreters of the federal constitution and statutory law.
They include a suspicion of activity of governmental officials acting within broad grants of discretionary authority and a belief that
an adversarial dispute settlement process is more rational and
more resistant to personal bias and self-interest. Conversely, the
advocates of the administrative model of behavior are primarily
concerned with the social rather than the individual perspective.
According to their value system, effective implementation of the
programs of government must come first and all administrative
* Associate Professor of Public Administration, West Virginia University.
J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1961; Ph.D., Public Administration, Syracuse University, 1974. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Ms.
Sally Roderick, graduate student in Masters of Public Administration Program,
West Virginia University, in the revision and preparation of this article for publication.

15 U.S.C. § 557 (1976).
2 "Adjudication," as used hereinafter, refers to the processes and rules found
in 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-58 (1976). It does not include cases that are not contested, such
as when the Internal Revenue Service finds a deficiency in the return and the
taxpayer concedes it. Neither does it include rule-making proceedings under 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
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functions (including adjudication) must therefore conform to
whatever organizational or managerial requirements are necessary
for progress toward politically defined goals. To sum up the differences in a rather simplistic but nonetheless realistic way, the judicialists emphasize procedure and "fair process," while administrationists emphasize the policy itself and the institutional nature of
decision making as a function of organization.
This essay asks three questions. First, has public policy, as
expressed through statutes and administrative regulation, Civil
Service Commission personnel administration policies, and articulated positions of professional interest groups, shaped the occupation of federal hearing examiner according to a specific model of
behavior, to wit: the judicial model, the administrative model, or
some combination of the two? Second, how important is the federal hearing examiner in the policymaking process? Third, assuming that we find a specific behavioral model to be dominant and
also that we find hearing examiners to be important in policy
formulation, what implications do these findings have for the nature, substance and process of administrative policy formulations?
I.

EVOLUTION OF THE DEBATE OVER ROLE

The issue of the proper role of the hearing examiner first arose
in 1906 when the position was established in the Interstate Commerce Commission.3 Congress saw a need for the subdelegation of
fact-finding duties and greater functional specialization in the
ICC.' But it did not come to be of great concern until the 1930's
when a flood of New Deal economic regulatory legislation greatly
expanded the adjudicative and investigatory roles of administrative agencies. Expansion took place along diverse paths in the
various agencies. A wide variety of methods were used for the
formal adjudication of cases, all of them involving fact finding or
investigation, hearings and hearing officers. Some of these methods were developed by the Congress in the acts establishing individual regulatory agencies,5 others were fashioned by the agencies
3 Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 20, 34 Stat. 584 (1906) (current version at 49 U.S.C.
§ 17 (1970)). The Hepburn Act expanded the jurisdiction of the ICC and brought

an increase in the number of preceedings before the Commission.
'L. MUSoLF, FEDERAL ExmaNm AND THE CONFLICT OF LAW AND ADNISTRATION
47-50 (1952) [hereinafter cited as MusoLF].
5 For example, the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, ch. 285, § 4(a), 41 Stat.
1063 (1920) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 797 (1976)) directed the emulation of
ICC procedure. According to Musolf, the ICC and FTC served as models for adjudicative procedures in the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1970), the
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themselves pursuant to general grants of adjudicative authority
from Congress.' Not only was procedure varied, but agencies also
differed in the weight they gave to the findings and recommendations of those persons conducting the hearings. The import of a
given hearing ranged from a mere advisory function with little
ability to discover evidence or to conduct more than a cursory
airing, to a full-blown trial-like proceeding with a right in the
losing party to appeal.7
With the expansion in federal hearings came a contemporaneous alarum and counterattack from the organized bar. The bar
saw in the expansion the possibility of the placement of administrative personnel into a dominant position in the settling of some
of the most important civil concerns affecting American citizens,
with consequent displacement of both lawyers' values and lawyers'
fees. The 1930's witnessed a concerted effort by the American Bar
Association through its Special Committee on Administrative Law
to bring about the following changes: (1) make the procedures used
in both adjudication and rulemaking in the agencies more like
those used in the courts, (2) separate the adjudicative function
from other administrative functions and move the exercise of adjudication to a common administrative court, (3) expand judicial
review of agency activity, and (4) professionalize hearing officers
and make them independent of agency influence.' The culmination of this effort was Congress' enactment of the Walter-Logan bill
in 1940;1 the effort died, however, when Congress was unable to
override President Roosevelt's acerbic veto. As the nation's chief
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1976), the Future Trading

Act of 1921, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (declared unconstitutional in part in 1921), the
Grain Futures Act of 1922, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17(b) (1976) (in 1936 the name of the act

was changed to the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936), the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-59 (1976), and the Communications Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-55 (1970). The FTC served as a model for the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act of 1935, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-12 (1976), The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1976), the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936,
7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17(b) (1976), and other legislation. See MusoLT, supra note 4, at 51-

56.

6 See generally MUSOLF, supra note 4, at 57-74. Factors causing variation
among the methods developed included the sophistication of the clientele, the
degree of specialized or technical knowledge involved in the dispute, convenience
factors and administrative practice.

I REPORT

OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE

PnocnDuRE, S. Doc. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).

a McGuire, The Proposed United States Administrative Court, 22 A.B.A. J.
197,199-202 (1937).
S. 915, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. (1939); H.R. 6324, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
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administrator in a period of great stress, President Roosevelt
shared the administrationist view which favored integrating adjudication with other agency functions in order to obtain concerted
action in policy formulation and for maximum effect in program
operations."0
The question of the role of the hearing examiner was itself a
major political issue which was located at the crossroads of the
great social and political issues of the day: positivist-social oriented governmental action versus protection of private property
rights, social state efficiency versus primacy of individual rights,
economic liberalism versus economic conservatism and active regulation versus emasculation of social regulation by a conservative
judiciary. In 1941 the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, appointed by the President under continuing
pressure from the organized bar, transmitted its now famous study
to Congress," and at the war's conclusion a monumental accommodation between the bar and the federal administration was at
hand. It was finally achieved in the form of the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946,12 which today remains the primary statutory source of law on federal administrative procedure.
The APA made the hearing examiner the principal focus of an
approach to adjudicative process which reflected a compromise
between judicialists and administrationists. The battle, however,
did not end there. It simply shifted to the courts where the interpretation of much general and ambiguous language in the APA was
to be worked out, and to the agencies themselves, particularly the
Civil Service Commission. This era of uncertainty and strife ended
in 1953 with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference.3 The effect of
this decision was to clearly set out the central role and responsibility of the Civil Service Commission in personnel administration
with respect to the office of hearing examiner. The decision clearly
"MusoLF,
"

supra note 4, at 75-77.

REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY

PROCEDURE,

GENERAL'S

COMMITTEE ON

ADMINISTRATIVE

supra note 7.

12Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237

(1946) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as APA].
13 345 U.S. 128 (1952). The Supreme Court upheld the requirements of 5 U.S.C.
§§ 3105, 7521, 5362 (1976), relating to assignment of cases in rotation, removal and
prescription of compensation by the Civil Service Commission, by reversing the
court of appeals decision which had affirmed a federal district court injunction
against enforcement of such provisions by the Civil Service Commission upon hearing examiners.
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favored the agencies and was contrary to the interests of the organized bar. The ABA thereafter abandoned its tactics of direct confrontation in the courts and legislature and shifted to the less
visible and more effective method of working with the Civil Service
Commission and the internal legal-administrative structures of the
agencies. Working through the Civil Service Commission's Advisory Committee on Hearing Examiners (created in 1962 as the
result of a recommendation of the temporary U.S. Administrative
Conference)," the U.S. Administrative Conference and the professional organization of federal hearing examiners (the Federal Trial
Examiners Conference),' 5 the legal profession has maintained a
continuing influence upon the process of formal adjudication as
carried on in administrative agencies. The relative success or failure of this effort can be seen in the discussion which follows.
II. MODELS

OF HEARING EXAMINER BEHAVIOR

The thesis that there are two models of behavior competing for
a central place in the role of the hearing examiner is a thesis most
peculiarly belonging to the American political system and its traditions. Crucial to the dichotomy is the tradition of the common
law and the doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances. The carriers of these beliefs are American lawyers and the
advocates of limited government. They see two dangers in the
assignment of adjudicative powers to administrative agencies: (1)
a great expansion of the opportunity for government to deal with
private persons in a way which is offensive to notions of fair procedure traditionally practiced or believed to be practiced in the
courts, and (2) a merger of multiple functions (adjudication, rule" Two temporary Administrative Conferences preceded the creation of the
permanent Conference in 1964. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-76 (1976). The first was called
by President Eisenhower in 1953, the second was established by President Kennedy
pursuant to Exec. Order No. 10,934, 26 Fed. Reg. 3,233 (1961).
The Conference adopted its recommendation as the result of a CSC recommendation. The advisory committee, which reported to the Commission, consisted of a
member and a general counsel of agencies employing hearing examiners, the President of the Federal Trial Examiners Conference, a law professor, an ABA lawyer
and a lawyer representing the Federal Bar Association. Macy, infra note 23, at 426.
"1 The organization has since changed its name to the Federal Administrative
Law Judge Conference.
"1 The essence of the dichotomy which is developed in the following pages is
drawn from MusoLF, supra note 4, at 75'80. This perspective is adopted and reinforced by K.C. DAvis, An nNSmATrm
E LAw AND GovERNmENT 165 (2d ed. 1975). See

also Feller, Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age, 41 COLUm. L. Rav. 585,
601 (1941).
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making and enforcement) in the hands of the same political actors,
causing an increase in power and the likelihood of its arbitrary and
tyrannical use by those actors." To check these potential evils and
to insure individual rights, lawyers and advocates for limited government, having lost the battle to prevent Congressional assignment of judicial powers to administrative agencies, now seek to
isolate the judicial function from other functions within
administration, and to make the exercise of that function more
respectable. They seek, in short, to impose a judicial model of
behavior upon administrators who adjudicate.
The administrative model is less traditionally rooted. Its origin, domestically, is in the creation of administrative regulatory
bodies in the late nineteenth century which came into being in
response to compelling political and social reasons. These resulted
from the perceived need to involve government in dealing with
complex and technical subject matter beyond the generalist capabilities of judges, to exercise continuing and active oversight and
restraint of abusive economic practices and arrangements, and to
circumvent a conservative judiciary if innovative social legislation
were to survive death through interpretation and be given a chance
to succeed."' Granting adjudicative powers to agencies was viewed
as a device to more fully arm them to effectively pursue legislative
programs in concert with other agency powers, including the rulemaking and organizational powers also vested in them by Congress. The power to settle disputes between government and private concerns is viewed as one means of implementing a program
by shaping and applying agency policy consistent with legislative
intent in concrete circumstances, not as a judicial function unto
itself. So the administrative purist would contend.
These models are well contrasted and summarized in a passage from Lloyd Musolf's treatise on the role and functions of
hearing examiners.
Stated simply, the court tradition sees the examiner as an official to be strictly isolated because of his deciding functions, to
be selected on the basis of his judge-like qualities, and to be
given powers and prestige commensurate with his important
station. Under the departmental, or agency tradition, the examiner is visualized as a part in a complex mechanism whose end
product is a decision. According to this view, to remove the part
p. WoLL, Amciuc BuRzzucRucy 84-99 (1963).
P7
K.C. DAvis, A

ISTRATVrE

LAw TExT 11-15 (2d ed. 1972).
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from the mechanism, or to replace it with an entirely different
kind of part, will make the9 mechanism break down, or at least
check its smooth running.
How might we operationalize an empirical study to determine
which model more nearly describes the actual behavior of hearing
examiners? Studies of examiners' attitudes, to the extent they are
available and methodologically sound, tell us something of how
examiners perceive their role. This kind of information, however,
leads us to confuse performance with aspiration and function with
design. I choose instead to focus upon some externally observable
indicia of role. One of these is supplied by Musolf in the preceeding
quotation-the degree of separation of the examiner's function
from other agency participants in the decision-making process.
Additional indicators are supplied by Musolf and others: finality
and formality of examiner decisions,2" degree of versatility in handling subject matter," control of the hearing,2 qualifications for
and manner of selection and promotion,n and personal status, independence and security.2
Table 1 lists specific indicators used for contrasting the role
models and notes the value of each variable (indicator) for each
model.
11MusoLF, supra note 4, at 75.
2

Id. at 108-109.

Id. at 111, 127.
" Id. at 124-27, 129-30.
= Id. at 138-171; see also Macy, The APA and the HearingExaminer: Products
of a Viable PoliticalSociety, 27 FED. BAR J. 351, 364-69, 374-78 (1967).
24 Macy, supra note 23, at 359-62, 369-93; Zwerdling, The Role and Functions
of FederalHearingExaminers, 400 ANNus 27-35 (1972).
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Tables 2, 3 and 4 present the data which tend to show whether
the dominant role in practice gravitates toward one or the other
model, at three different points in time. The data consists of declared policy (statutory language; administrative agency rule, regulation, or written directive; federal court opinions; attorney general opinions) and positions formally taken by critical interest
groups (for example, statements by officers of the ABA or Federal
Administrative Law Judge Conference, or recommendations of the
U.S. Administrative Conference). They are presented for three distinct points in time: (a) just prior to enactment of the APA in 1946
(in Table 2); (b) in 1961 (Table 3); and (c) the present (Table 4).
For each point in time and for each indicator I have made a qualitative judgment as to where on the scale of judicial to administrative behavior the datum should be placed. Using this method, a
view of the totality of performance upon these variables may be
had at a glance. Where official policy conflicts with an interest
group position, only the policy is given. Positions are used where
policy is not established.
1 clearly demonstrates
A simple glance at Tables 2, 3 and 4 A
two things about the hearing examiner/administrative law judge
role as measured by the role indicia: (1) it has moved steadily,
over the past twenty-five years, from the administrative model to
the judicial model (from the right to the left side of the table);
and (2) at present, the role is mixed, with judicial behavior dominant. Prior to the passage of the APA the only indicator of judicially dominant behavior was found in the policy the federal courts
had of directly reviewing records made before hearing examiners,
much as trial records are reviewed. Such a review was one of the
few controls the judiciary had which could check the excesses of
broad-gauged administrative programs and bring some procedural uniformity to bear upon the enormously diverse practices of
agency adjudicators. In addition, the courts lacked confidence in
the state of expertise thus far developed by the agencies in their
new and rapidly expanding programs (this view finds support in
the fact that decisions of the established ICC were rarely questioned).
In contrast, by 1978 administrative dominated behavior is recorded on the scales of only one indicator; the practice of agency
heads to give extensive review to administrative law judge initial
decisions having importance.2 Of special interest is the matter of
I

See pages 180-91.

n Coummumx Gawu

OF THE U.S., REPoRT To THE CONGRESS OF THE U.S.,
PRocEss: Bgrrm MANAGEMENT IS NEEDED 13-16 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as CompmoizO RGENERAL OF THE U.S.]. The Study examines only
ADNiNisTlvz LAW
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title since it appears to be a prime indicator of self-perception of
role. Pursuant to a recommendation of the Executive Council of
the U.S. Administrative Conference, which was supported by the
Federal Trial Examiners Conference and the Administrative Law
Section of the American Bar Association, the official designation
of the position was changed to "administrative law judge" by the
Civil Service Commission in 1972.26 Congress, in March of 1978,
gave statutory dignity to the title change. 21
Whereas the Civil Service Commission's Advisory Committee
on Hearing Examiners recommended and lobbied for many of the
changes in the early 1960's, today the Administrative Conference
is playing a central role. This body, whose Executive Council is
dominated by the legal profession and whose research is mostly
performed by law faculty, is an official federal agency charged with

the responsibility for determining how adninistrative procedure
may be improved and with recommending changes in law or policy
to federal agencies and to Congress. 9 Its record of success to date

is impressive. What is striking, from the viewpoint of this study,
is the nature of recommendations it has made which have not yet
been adopted. Several of these, including use of discovery procedures, finality accorded to hearing examiner decisions, continuing

legal training, and requirement of less specialized agency-related
knowledge for selection, would go far towards erasing whatever gap
now remains between present practice and the judicial behavioral
3

model described herein .

four agencies: the Department of Labor, the National Labor Relations Board, the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) and the Interstate
Commerce Commission. As an extreme example, the study reports that an ALJ
decision relating to federal labor-management relations reaches the Assistant Secretary for Labor-Management Relations only after being reviewed by the Director
of the Division of Operations, a GS-15 supervisor in the division, a staff member
in the division, an "agency committee" consisting of ranking agency officials and
a "case committee" consisting of another battery of ranking administrators but
excluding the Assistant Secretary! ICC and OSHRC also have multi-layered review
processes.
2 The change was administratively accomplished by the Civil Service Commission in August, 1972. 5 C.F.R. § 930.203a (1978).
Act of March, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, § 1, 92 Stat. 183.
23As of December 31, 1977, of the eleven members of the Executive Council
two were government lawyers, four were private lawyers, and one was a law college
faculty member. Only three ranking government officials were included.
AmImSTRATIV CONFERENCE OF TE U.S., 1977 REPORT (June, 1978).
2 Established as a permanent body by the Administrative Conference Act of
1964, §§ 1-7, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-75 (1977), as amended by Pub. L. No. 89-554, §§ 57176, 80 Stat. 378 (1966), and Pub. L. No. 92-526, 86 Stat. 1048 (1972).
'0 ADMINISTRATIVE

CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,

1969 REPoRT (June, 1970);
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The self-perception of administrative law judges that they are
"judges," evidenced by the title they helped to adopt, is reinforced
by statements of official spokespersons of the Federal Administrative Law Judge Conference. Joseph Zwerdling, a past president of
the FTEC, emphasized what he saw as the personal and independent nature of the position.
The basic concept of the independent hearing examiner requires
that he conduct the cases over which he presides with complete
objectivity and independence. In so operating, however, he is
governed, as in the case of any trial court, by the applicable and
controlling precedents. These precedents include the applicable
statutes and agency regulations, the agency's policies as laid
down in its published opinion, and applicable court decisions.
It is fair to say that the genuine independence and objectivity
of the hearing examiner is one of the important keystones of the
parties' confidence in the basic fairness of administrative proceedings.*'
Agency staff, the statement continues, is viewed as a participantadvocate in the proceeding whose position must be presented and
defended in open court. Its arguments should not carry special
weight with the hearing examiner.
If there is still opposition to continued judicialization of the
role of the hearing examiner in the Civil Service Commission, it
has not recently surfaced. Placid and peaceful relations between
and the Administhe organized bar, the FTEC, the Commission
32
trative Conference have been duly noted.
III. IMPACT OF ROLE CHANGE UPON THE POuCYMAKING PROCESS
What are the consequences, existing or potential, of what is
clearly a rapid drift toward a judicial role model of administrative
law judge behavior for the making of public policy? Presumably,
as the administrative law judge's role in decision making moves
from institutional-participatory to personal-professional, it beCONFERENCE OF THMU.S., 1970-71 REPoRT (July, 1971).
The Civil Service Commission has modified its qualification require-

ADmNIsTRATrV

ments for hearing examiner positions to recognize prior general trial experience in lieu of prior administrative practice in order to qualify. Thus,
lawyers without any previous government service or practice can now
become eligible for appointment as hearing examiners.
Id. at 18.
s' Zwerdling, supra note 24, at 29.
= Macy, supra note 23, at 378.
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comes very relevant and important to inquire as to his or her character,3 values, professional standards, and politics. The usefulness of examining such things, however, is premised on the
assumption that their share of influence in the policy-making
process has not shrunk relative to the shares of other actors.
Thus, before looking to the question of just what kind of person a
judicially oriented hearing examiner is, it is worthwhile appraising whether the role is great or small and whether it is expanding
or contracting.
What criteria may be used to evaluate the hearing examiner's
share of influence in the formulation of public policy? I suggest
three: (1) the kinds and importance of matters they are involved
in; (2) the role of adjudicative policy making as related to the
totality of policy formulated by administrative agencies (including
rulemaking, enforcement and managerial decisions as well as adjudicative decisions); and (3) the degree to which hearing examiner
decisions are allowed to stand by the agencies and by the courts.
The complexity of making the first two of these evaluations is well
beyond the design of this article. There are, however, such frequent
assertions in the literature and such obvious examples as to conclusively persuade as to the wide scope and crucial importance of
administrative adjudicative decisions. John Macy, former chairperson of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, states in his excellent
study of the evolution of the personnel program for hearing examiners that "the substance of the proceedings over which Federal
hearing examiners preside and with which their recommendations
and decisions are concerned is broad in scope, infinitely varied,
and tremendous in social, economic, and political import. ' 3 A
few examples round out his point: (1) Social Security Administration proceedings determining whether miners will be allowed
compensation for black lung disease; (2) under Medicare, whether
providers of service measure up to prescribed medical and hospital
standards, thus entitling them to substantial markets and profits;
(3) Federal Energy Regulatory Commission cases which fix the
rates producers and pipeline transmission companies may charge
1 The great majority of federal admistrative law judges are caucasian males.
The implications of this fact are not here in issue. It is tempting to incorporate what
has been said elsewhere concerning the relationship of disproportionate stalling
by race and sex on the one hand, and policy bias and the conduct of administrative
hearings and the actors therein on the other. I have not done so here. However, the
masculine referrant will be used hereinafter to remind the reader of the fact and to
capture whatever flavor it may lend.
31Macy, supra note 23, at 382.
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for gas transported or sold in interstate commerce and affect the
price every retail user in the nation must pay; (4) NLRB proceedings determining whether private sector unions and management
are bargaining in good faith; (5) FCC hearings leading to licensing
for the construction or operation of broadcasting stations; (6) ICC
hearings determining who may provide bus or train service within
given areas or between specific points; (7) hearings before the Mine
Safety and Health Admininstration determining whether a mine
is to be closed due to dangerous or potentially hazardous conditions; (8) hearings on bank charter revocations and bank mergers;
and (9) hearings on rates to be charged by interstate carriers whichi
in turn affect the costs of all domestically transported goods, both
commercial and private. There is a virtually endless list of issues
to be acted upon-deportations, nuclear plant siting, deceptive
advertising, aii routes, cancer-causing agents, employee compensation claim awards and so forth.
The energies of many agencies, particularly those engaged in
economic regulation, are absorbed and dominated by adjudication. The difficulty of formulating rules in advance to apply in
many unforeseen circumstances, plus the sheer volume of disputes
which press upon them for settlement, often cause agencies to
settle for case-by-case adjudication as the major tool of policy
formulation. This fact has been much criticized and has led often
to reform proposals for institutional separation of judicial and legislative functions, with the former collected from all agencies and
deposited in some form of general administrative court. Then, it
is argued, the administrator would be freed from the procedural
clutter and could concentrate his energies upon the making of
general rules applicable to broad classes of subjects and circumstances.
Judge Henry J. Friendly defends retaining adjudicative autonomy in the agency. 6 While acknowledging the necessity for
procedural reform, he argues that the more important priority is
the creation of bodies of substantive law in the agencies. This task
requires the combined efforts of agency officials and dictates
against insulating the administrative law judge from others in the
agency who have special knowledge or policy-making responsibilities.37 Whatever the merits of separation may be, it is clear that
" L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMI.STRATIVE ACTION 20 (1962).
3

See H.

FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINIsTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR

BmTR DEFINITION OF STANDARDS (1962).
v Id. at 174.
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administrative process scholars agree that adjudication is by far
the chief (although not the best) source of the policy formulated
3
in these agencies. 1
Determining the weight given by agency leadership to administrative law judge initial decisions is a more difficult matter, although one at least superficially susceptible to empirical measurement. Statistics relating to the volume of initial decisions and the
corresponding percentage of such decisions remaining intact after
agency review have been routinely recorded." However, such statistics lose much of their significance in the face of the variability
in the review procedures from agency to agency, the failure to
distinguish routine and inconsequential cases from complex cases
and those having policy implications and the precedential value of
decisions. Whether the agency disturbs or does not disturb an initial decision is heavily influenced by such variables as the volume
of cases initially decided, the level of staff support available to aid
in the process of agency review, the amount of time available to
those with official authority to review to actually review, 0 and the
predilection of the agency leadership for the balance between adjudication and rule making as modes of decision making. Indeed, the
complexity of the matter would appear to make an effort at displaying a statistical array a disservice. One important piece of
datum, however, is the fact that sixty-six percent of responding
ALJs' state that the nature of their agency's review is de novo and
involves the entire case, rather than being limited to the matters
that are appealed. In the face of rising case loads and demands
upon agency time, this points to a lack of confidence in ALJs by
agency leadership. This fact is reinforced by evidence of multilayered reviews of initial decisions used in most agencies.
" See generally,Blumrosen, Toward Effective Administration of New Regulatory Statutes, 29 AD. L. REv. 87, 113-14 (1977); H. FRIENDLY, supra note 36; Shapiro,
The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HAIRv. L. REv. 921 (1965); and Robinson, The Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1970).
31Macy, supra 23, at 389.
40See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936); Morgan v. United States,
304 U.S. 1 (1938); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941). This line of
decisions established the responsibility of the agency official or board charged with
the review function to actually "hear" the case. Although this does not amount to
a requirement of actually listening to all of the witnesses, it does necessitate consideration of the entire record of the hearing made before the administrative law judge.
11Six hundred and ninety-two of the 1,025 ALJs working for federal agencies,
or 67%, responded. See COMPMOLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., supra note 25, at 12.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol81/iss2/2

28

Pops: The
Judicialization of Federal
Administrative
JUDGES Law Judges: Implica
LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE
Despite differing levels of confidence in ALJ initial decisions,
they are often critical in the final decisions of agencies and likely
to become more critical. Increasing numbers of ALJs 2 and cases
place increasingly greater burdens upon reviewers. Pressures are
mounting to accord additional finality to ALJ decisions."3 The
Comptroller General, sharply critical of delays caused by extensive
agency review in a recent report to Congress, recommended that
Congress enact legislation to accord greater finality to ALJ decisions.4
In light of this evidence it seems fair to say that, at a minimum, hearing examiners are important participants in the making
of public policy. If this is indeed the case, then it becomes imperative to inquire into the kind of people administrative law judges
are-how they are trained, how they advance, the pressures and
constituent influences to which they are exposed, and, to the extent they perceive themselves as members of a professional group,
the standards and norms of that group.

IV. THE JUDICIAL STYLE
As noted above, hearing examiners think of themselves as
judges (Administrative Law Judges, Federal Trial Examiners Conference). Furthermore, the evolution of their role, as dictated by
law and policy, has moved that self-perception very much closer
to reality. It is important to ask, therefore, whether there is such
a thing as a "judicial style" which contains values or norms having
important consequences for the quality and nature of administrative decisions.
It has been argued with much force that too much has been
made over the differences between administrative and judicial
The number of AIJs and the number of agencies employing them has increased from 196 and 15 agencies, respectively, in 1946 to 1025 and 28 agencies in
1978. Of the 1025, 826 are categorized as permanent, 199 as temporary.
CoMTRaoLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., supranote 25, at 4.
"1 The President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization criticized
"overjudicialization of the administrative adjudicatory process as evidenced by
systematic full commission review of agency hearing examiner decisions" resulting
in delay and ineffective use of agency resources. CompoRoLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S.,
supra note 25, at 12.
1 The Comptroller General recommended that the heads of agencies employing AL~s "[e]stablish procedures which would preclude extensive review of AI
decisions in cases where the parties have not filed exceptions and where the case
does not involve compelling public interest issues or new policy determinations."
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF U.S., supra note 25, at 47.
42
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behavior, and that most of what appear to be differences are illusory. In the best court tradition the adversary system promotes
fairness, saves time and energy by focusing upon the real issues
dividing the parties, brings policy arguments into play, promotes
compromise and cooperation and encourages innovation in resolving conflict. A good judge has a capacity for cool appraisal,
matches various means to a given end, explores hidden fact
through direct inquiry and confrontation, conceives strategy and
has a true instinct for teamwork. 5 Paul Freund attributes to the
lawyer a concern for collaborative procedure and the reaching of
shared goals.4" This team instinct serves diverse points of view both
internal and external to the agency and allows the administrative
law judge to comprehend the complex mission of the agency. All
of these qualities are quite compatible with the qualities of a good
administrator and may even be demanded of one.
To further confound the dichotomy, it has been argued that
the presumably independent federal judge, sitting singly with
guaranteed lifetime tenure, is in fact part of a system imposing
hierarchical pressures upon him (he aspires to a seat on a higher
court, he dislikes being reversed and he is part of a judicial administrative structure), and that his pattern of thought is like that of
an administrator. Both judge and administrator, it is argued, are
incrementalists and seek workable results with the least amount
of disruption." The similarity vanishes, however, when one considers the unique duties imposed upon administrators by virtue of
programmatic responsibility established by statute and the requirement for specialized knowledge in a field of public activity.
Special elements of administrative behavior arise not so much
from the way administrators think, but from their organizational
roles. For the judge's part, role and functions are rooted in a system
which centers on a contest between two adversaries for some tangible advantage. In administrative adjudication, however, the role
often calls for regularizing relations between the government and
the regulated class so that the purpose of a government program
is served. The decision should rest not on the basis of mutual
adjustment of the interests of the two parties before the tribunal,
but on the basis of serving the goals of the agency with respect to
all parties, existing or potential, affected by the instant policy. If
J.

CAVANAUGH, THE LAWYER IN SocIETY

30-35

(1963).

See Freund, The Legal Profession, in THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICA (K. Lynn
ed. 1967).
" See M. SHAPIRO, THE SuPRmE

CoURT

A ADImIiTRATVE AoENCIS (1968).
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administrative law judges "go it on their own" and make the goal
of their activity a decision on the merits of the dispute between
litigants, they lose much of their usefulness to their employing
agencies 8 And, of course, if the agency leadership is itself predominantly engaged in adjudication as opposed to other modes of decision making leading to policy formulation, then narrowly focused
adversarial decisions by administrative law judges become the
basis for much agency policy.
Agency policy generated through adjudication need not be of
an ad hoc, case-by-case nature. Administrative law judges can be
socialized and trained to understand the political dimensions of
the agency's mission and to work toward developing a cohesive
body of case law which both aids the pursuit of programmatic goals
and establishes the kind of consistency in the application and
formulation of policy that permits the regulated to rely with some
confidence upon a predictable state of affairs. But such unfortunately is not the case. Administrative law judges think about and
are trained in procedure rather than in substance. This can easily
be seen in the continuing drive of the Administrative Conference
to modify civil service testing to exclude knowledge of a specialized
nature suited to particular agency programs."9 Much of the fault,
according to Judge Friendly, must be laid at the doorstep of the
legal profession:
If our machine age has invented any counters for detecting the
fallacious and the equivocal as sensitive as the professors and
students of the great law schools, I have not seen them. Yet,
with a few distinguished exceptions, the law teachers and the
law reviews have not yet begun to do for the administrative
agencies what, for many years, they have been doing for the
courts. Perhaps I am quite wrong about this, but I have the
impression that the study of administrative law in most law
schools, at least until very recently, has been concentrating
unduly on procedure at the expense of substance, as the criticism of the agencies in the profession surely has. Another way
of stating this would be that instruction has been too much
concerned with what the courts do with the agencies rather than
with what the agencies do with themselves. Yet the procedural
battle has been largely won in the type of agency with which we
have been here concerned-indeed, attempts to wage it further
MusoLF, supra note 4, at 179.
See ArDmusTRATivE CONFRENCE OF Tm U.S., supranote 30; ADisTmRTiv
CONFERENCE OF THz U.S., 1972 REPORT (1973).
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in some respects may do more harm than good; it is in the
substance of administrative adjudication that improvement is
sorely needed.5'
Adjudication is a decision mode which relies upon adversaries
to develop the information base which informs a neutral third
party's judgment. Such a process for fact-finding is ideal when
parties.disagree over a contested truth and struggle to persuade a
neutral decision maker that evidence supports their construction
of the facts. But in many administrative hearings what is at issue
are not objective facts but what may be termed "social facts."'"
When dealing with a question of fact, the typical legally trained
mind will concentrate upon the event or what happened in the
case. Under the same circumstances, an administrator, charged
with programmatic responsibility, is legitimately concerned not so
much with the case, but rather with the aggregate effect of any rule
or guideline upon all the subjects of the program. Thus, an administrator's view is, or ought to be, broader. It must take into account
other circumstances and other parties not within the specific circumstances, but within the context logically suggested by the specific. An attempt should be made to deal with the general problem
uncovered, not simply with the case at hand.
A further failing of the judicial style is its neglect of the concepts and methods of social science. More can be done in redirecting administrative adjudicative energies toward policy substance
if other disciplines besides law, particularly political science and
economics, are drawn upon.52 Freund is critical of law schools for
their failure "not to train students in the social sciences, but to
prepare them for collaborative enterprise by seeing that they acquire some insight into the methods and concepts of those disciplines."
To summarize, although many qualities of judicial thought
and behavior comport nicely with ideals of administrative
decision making, there are other qualities which, when carried into
public administration, are ill-suited to public policy formulation.
These include a narrowing of vision from the broad class of clients
z' H. FRIENDLY, supra note 36, at 173-74.
D. HoRowrrz, Tim CoUmrs Dm
SociAL PoucY 45-51 (1977). "Social facts are
the recurrent patterns of behavior on which policy must be based." Id. at 45. They
are thus to be distinguished from "historical facts" which "are the events that have
transpired between the parties to a lawsuit." Id.
5

H. FRIENDLY, supra note 36, at 175.

0 Freund, supranote 46, at 45.
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to the case client, an excessive concern with procedure at the cost
of developing a cohesive, specialized and substantive law, and the
neglect of social science concepts and methods.
V.

INEFFICIENCY IN THE USE OF REsoURcEs

These preoccupations and preferences of judicial thought and
style have an important impact upon agency resources. They incline agencies toward favoring adjudication to rulemaking as the
primary decision mode. Rulemaking, however, is a more efficient
mode of decision. The announcement of a rule, given the protections and processes set out in the Administrative Procedure Act,54
directly addresses issues relating the agency to its clients or subjects. If the rule is well thought out and participation of the affected parties is broad, the rule stands a good chance of settling
many potential disputes in a single proceeding. If the agency fails
to act in advance by rule, relying instead upon a case by case
adjudicative approach, the result is obvious. Adjudication, by the
very nature of the elaborate procedural protections employed, is a
time consuming process which focuses upon the facts of a case
involving a single individual. When that process is multiplied by
the number of contending clients or subjects that share somewhat
imperfectly the issue of dispute, the agency spends a great deal of
time working toward a policy in an uncoordinated, time exhaustive
manner. Many agencies thus acquire massive backlogs of cases
which absorb much of their energy.
To be sure, there are many instances where agencies lack the
experience or knowledge to formulate a rational rule in advance
which would satisfy the majority of the parties. The use of adjudication in such situations to gain experience is sensible. But when
reliance upon the adjudicative process becomes habitual and continues long after the necessary experience needed to make the rule
is gained, the result is an obvious waste of agency resources.
VI.

NARROWING OF POLITICAL DEBATE AND
INFORMATION BASE

The role of rules of law in government, whether procedural or
substantive, varies according to political ideology. In a society
which distrusts government and wishes to preserve a large share
of autonomous private action the rules are used to restrict government action, to make it predictable, to keep it within ascertainable
- APA, § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
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boundaries and to protect individual rights. Courts function to
keep administrative action within these guidelines. In a society
which views government action as a positive force in guiding and
shaping social life, administration is less restricted by rules and
courts. The first, or restrictive approach is said to predominate in
American constitutional law and has had an important influence
on our administrative law. The current movement toward deregulation is a reaffirmation of these traditional views. So also are the
strengthening of the Freedom of Information Act55 and the passage
of privacy legislation in 1974.8
Nonetheless, it is a fact that a great many, perhaps most,
administrative actions are performed pursuant to Very broad
grants of delegated authority, thus restricting the ability of courts
to effectively limit discretion. 5 Whether owing to statutory intent
or to recognition of the futility of attempting to effectively administer review of a mammoth bureaucracy, the courts have generally
affirmed administrators in their exercise of discretion." Reviewing
courts are left with the functionsof validating agency jurisdiction,
insuring fair process and applying the substantial evidence rule"5
to insure that findings of fact and of mixed fact-law are not clearly
unwarranted based on the hearing record. The net effect is that
administrators, including adjudicatory tribunals, are relatively
free to interpret and apply policy as they desire. Nonet observes
that
while focusing on whether government acted within the scope
(of authority), legal criticism is diverted away from the substance and import of official determinations. The system allows
administrators to develop protected areas where they can exercise discretion without legal scrutiny; once their authority in
such areas is legally confirmed, its use is free from further control. This is reflected in the often stated principle that judicial
review of administrative determinations should be restricted to
questions of jurisdiction, and should not extend to the merits
of agency decisions. In either case, whether discretion is reduced
or indirectly protected, there is no place in legal argument to
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
17

5-U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
See generally K.C. DAvis, DISCmIONARY JusTicE: A PRELIumINARY INQuiRY

(1977).
See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971);
NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 11 (1944).

5 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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challenge official policy. The legal process renounces any role
TM
in fashioning the substance or direction of public policy.
Not only is the scope of debate upon policy questions narrowed, but the nature and use of the data itself is constrained and
distorted by rules of procedure and the tactics of adversarial combat. Judge Jerome Frank observed, in a famous essay,' that lawyers are trained to discredit expert testimony against their clients
despite the knowledge that such testimony is accurate and relevant.
The purpose of these tactics-often effective-is to prevent the
trial judge or jury from correctly evaluating the trustworthiness
of witnesses and to shut out evidence the trial court ought to

receive in order to approximate the truth.
In short, the lawyer aims at victory, at winning in the fight,

62
not at aiding the court to discover the facts.

The nub of the evidentiary problem raised by the adjudicatory
system is the trade off between fairness to the parties and the
application of scientific or technical expertise. Few would argue
that the adjudicative model is improper where the issue is the
truth or falsity of facts in issue, or where a possible consequence
of the agency's action is substantial hardship for the individual
party being proceeded against. But where formal adversarial adjudication, complete with many elements of full due process, is used
to make decisions involving complex issues of economics, human
motivation, biomedics, or politics, decision making becomes less
rational than it might be. These narrowing factors, taken together,
point to both a less rational and less democratic policy process as
flowing from a misapplication of the judicial model to administrative decision making.
VII.

THE AGENCY AND ITS POLITICAL ENRoNmENT

The judicial model changes the nature of agency-interest
group relations, because it insulates the administrative law judge
from the rest of the agency and compells the client to deal with the
administrative law judge alone in an attempt to formulate policy
(in an atmosphere ill-suited to concentrate upon policy). Several
effects of this change may be suggested. Whether such effects are
T0

p. NONET, ADMiNismATwE Jusum: ADvoCACY AND CHANGE INA GOvERNmENT

AGENCY 5 (1969).
, J. FRANK, CouRS oN TRtL (1973).
Si Id.
at 85.
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"good" or "bad" depends upon individual views as to the proper
relationship between the legislature and the executive, the scope
of administrative discretion, and the rights, access and influence
of individuals and groups. Changes which are likely to occur include the following:
1) The agency becomes less responsive to the political demands of interest groups. Access to agency leaders is reduced by
increased delegation of decision-making authority to administrative law judges. At the same time, administrative law judges are
becoming less sensitive to their political environment by being
further isolated from agency staff personnel.
2) Policy is more disjointed because of the case approach and
lack of attention given to the building of a cohesive body of substantive law.
3) Because of reduced access to agency leaders, political pressures are exerted more often in an indirect manner through congressional committees and individual congressmen, administrators
in other agencies, the media, or the executive chain of command.
Although this may provide more breathing room for agency leaders
(by shifting the pressures of direct contact to administrative law
judges and others), it will likely make the agency's task of building
and sustaining an administrative constituency (including key interest group support) more difficult.
4) The decline of administrative constituencies would
heighten the need for political responsiveness. Structural changes
may be attempted. One such possible alteration is the transfer of
regulatory functions from independent regulatory commissions" to
executive line agencies 4 so as to afford a more predictable environment for interest group claims and greater access to administratorpoliticians. Another is the acceleration of demands for deregulation and debureaucratization.
5) A decline in the health, size and effectiveness of agencies
may also be in store. In short, the administrative law judge is an
important buffer between the agency leadership and its clientele.
This puts a burden upon him to be sensitive to political realities
and political change. If he is out of touch with the politics and the
13Independent regulatory commissions are characterized by multi-member
heads having staggered terms and a good measure of protection from removal by
the executive.
64Executive line agencies are agencies headed by single administrators appointed by the President who serve at his will and pleasure.
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environment of agency policy making, his decisions must constantly be monitored or else the agency's ability to build the constituency it needs to survive and prosper will be impaired. 5

VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

To study the functions and role of administrative law judges
is to gain insight into the decision-making process in administrative agencies having substantial enforcement and regulatory powers. This is especially true where adjudication forms a major part
of the agency's total output. The Administrative Procedure Act
has placed the administrative law judge at the very center of the
policy process in such agencies. His operations are at the heart of
the controversy between the legal profession and the political leadership of the government, or, putting the matter more broadly,
between the forces of limited government and the forces of governmental positivism.
Examination of declared public policy and articulated professional interest group positions regarding the role and functions of
administrative law judges leads inescapably to the conclusion that
their behavioral pattern has been moving steadily from an administrative to a judicial model in the last quarter of a century. The
shift appears most traceable to accommodation between the legal
profession and the Civil Service Commission in the early 1960's
which allowed the former a large measure of influence in personnel
administration respecting hearing examiners. The trend has been
further strengthened by creation of the Administrative Conference
of the U.S. and the influence of that lawyer-dominated organization in initiating legislative and Civil Service Commission rule
changes relating both to the position of hearing examiner and the
formal adjudicative process.
When we turn our attention to the consequences of these inroads of legal and court professionalism for public policy making,
we find elements which both enhance and detract from policymaking principles generally embraced by public administration
practice in the United States. Elements or qualities of the judicial
model ill-suited to effective administration and policy making are:
(1) a focus on an adjustment of the issues between the parties
which reduces the amount of participation of potentially interested
groups and individuals (especially where the agency neglects general rule-making activity), (2) adversary psychology emphasizing
a MuSoLF, supra note 4, at 179.
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victory for one of the parties, thereby narrowing the kinds, amount
and accuracy of information needed for expanding policy alternatives and justifying policy decisions, and (3) an exaggerated concern for procedure rather than for the production of substantive
policy in line with agency goals. To the extent that the judicial
model has been carried into complex decision areas of scientific,
economic, behavioral, or political variables, it has resulted in a less
rational, less democratic decision process. It is also forcing a
change in agency-client intergroup relations with shifts in access
and pressure patterns, with consequences which may be profound
for the political system, but the nature of which are uncertain.
If reform is to occur it seems necessary to change the legal
profession from within to accommodate the needs of rational and
democratic administrative policy formation. This view assumes
the legal profession's co-optation of the Civil Service Commission
apparatus relative to administrative law judges and the dominance
of the organized bar in the shaping and altering of administrative
formal adjudicative procedure. Judge Friendly's exhortation to
legal educators and scholars to turn their attention away from
procedure and toward-the study of substantive policy corresponding to separate areas of administrative activity is well taken and
will hopefully gain advocates.
Beyond this central and fundamental reform, however, adjustments can be made to structure agency adjudication so as to permit broader representation of interests, a broader and more reliable input of information and a broader consideration of policy
issues. This would suggest a backing away from the current emphasis on adversarial procedure, away from the growing tendency
to treat administrative law judge decisions with trial court finality,
and away from further erosion of the specialized substantive
knowledge base required for the selection of administrative law
judges. It means moving toward expanding the role of other kinds
of knowledge and methods of knowledge accumulation, particularly those of the social sciences, increasing the representation of
all interested parties in policy making and enlarging the role of
politically sensitive and responsible administrators in the policy
process.
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